“GitHub Enterprise Cloud with data residency” is hosted on separate infrastructure and dedicated subdomains under *.ghe.com. It’s been around since November 2024z
It’s not the same thing as GitHub Enterprise Cloud hosted on the shared global network on github.com.
Just to be clear, I am on Github Enterprise, and am also experiencing this disruption both privately and publicly on every org and project I have access to.
I'm told that GitHub has asserted to us that moving to this model means we would not be exposed to github.com outages. It's not at feature parity with github.com though.
That's what I don't understand. They could mitigate their name so much if they just split free/paid/enterprise. It's already shown that enterprise is much more estable and is largely unaffected from service disruptions. Why don't they go one more layer? For sure it's worth the extra complexity.
There is no such thing as "just split" there is 20+ years of legacy decisions and even if the split is relatively clean it is still probably 1 years work for 200 people for maybe a marginal improvement.
The real money is going to go towards, "make this all more reliable".
Depending on the cause of the current issues, that move would likely cause more harm to paid services than good.
Their last postmortem made clear that their challenges are operational. Scale puts pressure on operation, but it's not what blocks them from keeping up.
Doubling the operation doubles the operational challenges.
Things can go wrong, but really, its been a lot and we're normalizing that to an unhealthy degree...
I wonder if it was down that much, if users would get credits the way we pay when we use the services - its kind of ridiculous for a critical service to be down that much and all we do is "ah okay, its just github". Like, as if that was normal to be down that much...
> Update - primary failover briefly improved performance but did not fully mitigate, we've throttled inbound traffic and are investigating upstream Vitess issues
>Update - primary failover briefly improved performance but did not fully mitigate, we've throttled inbound traffic and are investigating upstream Vitess issues
And now they're blaming their upstream vendor! Embarrassing stuff to be writing on a public page.
I spent a bunch of time during the outage last week setting up forgejo and some custom action runners. At the time, I was worried I was wasting time and getting distracted from my real work...alas, I guess not. Gonna finish up that work and complete the move today.
Notice odd behavior on GitHub. Get gaslit by a green status page. Notice more odd behavior on GitHub. Think it must be me this time. See unusual action queuing. Ah, an incident on the status page. Go for a walk and check HN on my phone. The AI SDLC.
> We've identified an issue with a database primary and are failing over to a replica immediately
This is why it's hard to take GitHub seriously. How can a single database cause an outage for everyone? This is amateur stuff. Have they no sharding or partitioning internally? Paying customers should not be impacted in the same way as free ones are.
RDBMS replication and failover is way more difficult and manual than anyone would like. You can't just set up two postgres, tell them they're clustered and have it basically work; at a minimum you have to design the client to somehow know which one is currently the master, or use some sort of proxy (which becomes its own SPOF).
RDBMS integrity basically requires that one master server is responsible for the whole data set and other servers may replicate from it. And it usually doesn't wait for a quorum of replicas, just for one, because the design is to recover from a hardware failure, not a network partition, although that could be fixed at the cost of increased latency.
> primary failover briefly improved performance but did not fully mitigate, we've throttled inbound traffic and are investigating upstream Vitess issues
Did you not read it? Just because there's a database primary doesn't mean there is 1 primary database. There's likely man redundancies and they have issue with how they're allocating traffic to them which is in turn causing an issue with how much traffic redundancies are receiving.
Which surprised me because of the many hundreds of services I rely on regularly that also have status pages.
Probably just a coincidence that Github started to have issues after beginning their move to Azure at the end of last year.
It’s not the same thing as GitHub Enterprise Cloud hosted on the shared global network on github.com.
https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/dat...
I'm told that GitHub has asserted to us that moving to this model means we would not be exposed to github.com outages. It's not at feature parity with github.com though.
The real money is going to go towards, "make this all more reliable".
Their last postmortem made clear that their challenges are operational. Scale puts pressure on operation, but it's not what blocks them from keeping up.
Doubling the operation doubles the operational challenges.
I wonder if it was down that much, if users would get credits the way we pay when we use the services - its kind of ridiculous for a critical service to be down that much and all we do is "ah okay, its just github". Like, as if that was normal to be down that much...
Common Name (CN) www.dayswithoutgithubincident.com
Organization (O) <Not Part Of Certificate>
Common Name (CN) YR1
Organization (O) Let's Encrypt
Issued On Monday, August 10, 2026 at 10:01:51 AM
Expires On Sunday, November 8, 2026 at 9:01:50 AM
Seems like a weird thing to post on a status page. Shouldn't this have happened automatically and therefore precluded the need to inform users of it?
And now they're blaming their upstream vendor! Embarrassing stuff to be writing on a public page.
This is why it's hard to take GitHub seriously. How can a single database cause an outage for everyone? This is amateur stuff. Have they no sharding or partitioning internally? Paying customers should not be impacted in the same way as free ones are.
RDBMS integrity basically requires that one master server is responsible for the whole data set and other servers may replicate from it. And it usually doesn't wait for a quorum of replicas, just for one, because the design is to recover from a hardware failure, not a network partition, although that could be fixed at the cost of increased latency.
> primary failover briefly improved performance but did not fully mitigate, we've throttled inbound traffic and are investigating upstream Vitess issues
Maybe you expect that part of GitHub to have a scale where a single database can't handle it, but evidently that isn't true.
We can criticise them for not splitting up free and paid customers but again, most companies don't do that.